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Abstract—This paper proposes the use of graph pattern match-
ing for investigative graph search, which is the process of searching
for and prioritizing persons of interest who may exhibit part or all
of a pattern of suspicious behaviors or connections. While there
are a variety of applications, our principal motivation is to aid law
enforcement in the detection of homegrown violent extremists.
We introduce investigative simulation, which consists of several
necessary extensions to the existing dual simulation graph pattern
matching scheme in order to make it appropriate for intelligence
analysts and law enforcement officials. Specifically, we impose a
categorical label structure on nodes consistent with the nature of
indicators in investigations, as well as prune or complete search
results to ensure sensibility and usefulness of partial matches to
analysts. Lastly, we introduce a natural top-k ranking scheme that
can help analysts prioritize investigative efforts. We demonstrate
performance of investigative simulation on a real-world large
dataset.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the era of big data and user-generated content, one of
the most pressing needs continues to be filtering irrelevant
data and finding the desired information to make timely and
accurate decisions [17]. Since much of the data in a variety
of domains can be conveniently represented as heterogeneous
data graphs, graph pattern matching is of growing importance
to find such information. While a recent overview [17] lists
complex object identification, software plagiarism detection,
and traffic route planning as some additional applications, the
bulk of the research in this field is oriented towards social
search and recommender systems [1] [4] [7] [10] [14] [16]
[22] [28]. In social search, for instance, one may utilize
graph pattern matching to find an entity with specific types
of connections or attributes, while recommender systems help
individuals form collaboration networks with people with
specific skills and expertise.
Investigative Graph Search. This paper proposes the use
of graph pattern matching for investigative graph search
and introduces several necessary extensions to existing graph
pattern matching schemes in order to make them appropriate
for intelligence analysts and law enforcement officials. We
consider investigative graph search (or simply investigative
search) as a special case of social search, and define it
as a process of searching for and prioritizing persons of
interest who may exhibit part or all of a pattern of suspicious
behaviors or connections. Some distinguishing characteristics
of investigative graph search from other searches include:
1) Nodes in a query pattern are hypothesized indicators of a
latent behavior of interest; not all indicators may appear
in the matched result to make a partial match worthy of
further investigation.
2) Some indicators nodes are only significant in the context
or presence of other indicators.
3) The ranked full or partial match results should help analysts
prioritize among potentially many matches based upon the
presence of red-flag indicators as well as the similarity of
the matches to the query.
While investigative graph search can be used in a variety
of applications from the detection of signs for post-traumatic
stress in veterans to tracking customer journey indicators, our
primary motivation is to aid in the detection of homegrown vi-
olent extremists (HVEs) who seek to commit acts of terrorism
in the United States and abroad.
Facilitated and inspired by extremist organizations utilizing
the internet and social media for recruitment and radical-
ization, HVEs have presented significant challenges to law
enforcement in recent years. In 2011 the National Coun-
terterrorism Center (NCTC) published the results of a study
that examined the behavioral indicators of 27 recent cases
[20] and identified a total of 16 specific behaviors that were
present in at least half the cases. This included not only active
online participation in blogs or chat rooms, but also com-
munication with extremists, consumption of jihadist videos
and propaganda, suspicious foreign travel or attempted travel,
and expressions of acceptance or intent to conduct violent
jihad or martyrdom operations. Despite the identification of
these behavioral indicators, the risk of threats going undetected
to law enforcement remains high. The FBI Director recently
requested help from local law enforcement to keep track of
HVEs, saying “It’s an extraordinarily difficult challenge task
to find – that’s the first challenge – and then assess those who
may be on a journey from talking to doing” [21].
A Motivating Example. A small example problem related
to the investigative search for homegrown violent extremists is
shown in Fig. 1. A simplified query graph Q of some possible
indicators of a homegrown violent extremist is shown in (a).
The pattern is a person who 1) posted radical- and extremist-
labeled n-grams from a social media account, 2) underwent
suspicious travel to a foreign country and received terrorist-
related training, and 3) purchased a firearm. A simplified
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Fig. 1: An example graph query of a potential homegrown
violent extremist (a) and a fictitious data graph of 4 people
with on and off-line activities (b). Nodes in the data graph
represent distinct entities (e.g., person or social media account)
or behaviors (e.g., posting extremist n-gram, purchasing a
firearm, etc.) with the class label shown inside the node. The
letter of the label outside a node is a code for the class,
and the number (if applicable) denotes the person responsible
with that entity or behavior. The query graph represents the
pattern of nodes by class that may help identify potential
homegrown violent extremists. Fig. 1(c): Desired matching
set via investigative simulation that includes full and partial
matches in rank order.
data graph G of 4 people each with various on- and off-line
activities is shown in (b).1 The problem is to find all whole
or partial matches of the query Q in the data graph G and
present results according to some intuitive ranking scheme.
Dual simulation [16], which represents the state of the art in
graph pattern matching through simulation-based approaches
short of the match locality constraint, technically returns only
Person 3 (and his related activities) as the only matching
connected subgraph. Because the algorithmic implementation
[16] of dual simulation also returns remnant individual node
matches, the n-grams from Person 1 and 4 (D1−1, D1−2, C4)
1While not a focus of this paper, it is important to note that our approach
is predicated on access to and proper classification/labeling of data from
open and restricted sources to produced large heterogeneous data graphs. For
example, we envision that social media data (e.g., Twitter, Facebook) would be
fused with firearm background check databases and local/state/federal criminal
and terrorist databases (including data from the FBI’s Tripwire and ‘FBI Tips’
programs as well as the TSA’s Automated Targeting System and Secure Flight
programs).
as well as the ‘purchase firearm’ node (G2) from Person 2 are
partial matches. From this, we identify three shortcomings of
dual simulation for investigative search: 1) the requirement
for every node in the query to have some match, and no
allowance for partial matches, is too restrictive when an
investigator may include indicator nodes in the query which
need not be associated with every person of interest, 2) any
remnant node matches with valid matching indicators do not
contain the subject of the search, and 3) remnant node matches
may contain nodes that are innocuous activities except when
observed with other suspicious indicators.
Our modification to dual simulation, which we call inves-
tigative simulation, is designed to address these aforemen-
tioned shortcomings, and returns the match result in Fig. 1(c).
Person 3 (and his related activities) is still the only complete
match for all indicators. However, Persons 1 and 4 (and their
related activities) are now also returned as partial matches due
to the posting of radical and extremist n-grams. Note that none
of Person 2’s activities (’purchase firearm’ or social media
account nodes) are now returned because neither indicator
is important unless there are other suspicious indicators of
motivation or intent to commit targeted violence.
In order to return such a match result from the dual
simulation pattern matching schemes, we determined the need
to impose a categorical structure on nodes consistent with
the nature of indicators in the threat assessment literature, as
well as the need to prune or complete search results to ensure
sensibility and minimize false positives. Lastly, we introduce
an intuitive ranking scheme to help investigators prioritize
results based upon the presence of red-flags.
Our Contributions. Our two main contributions are:
1) We propose investigative simulation, an extension of the
dual simulation graph pattern matching method that is spe-
cialized for investigative search, and propose an algorithm
to produce more sensible matches of potential subjects for
further investigation.
2) We propose a roadmap of further advancements necessary
to investigative search, particularly for detecting the radi-
calization of homegrown violent extremists in open source
on- and off-line behavior.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides an overview of related work in this field. Section
III reviews definitions and notation. Section IV defines the
investigative simulation method of graph pattern matching.
Section V presents the results of the application of our
algorithm on a real world dataset. Section VI provides two
case studies related to homegrown violent extremists and the
modeling context for our investigative search approach on
heterogeneous networks. Finally, Section VII concludes the
paper and outlines some recommendations for future work in
investigative simulation.
II. RELATED WORK
Our work builds upon advances in graph pattern matching in
the static setting. Several surveys exist, including [2] and [11].
Of the two principal types of matching, exact and inexact, we
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focus our efforts on the state of the art in inexact matching
due its flexibility for returning results in the presence of
noise or errors in the data [11]. The notable works in static
inexact matching include ‘best-effort matching’ [28], TALE
[27], SIGMA [19], NeMa [14], and MAGE [22]. The ‘inexact’
component of these works primarily involves the allowance
for finding nearby matches for nodes in which an exact match
does not exist.
Of these, the work most closely related to ours in intention
is [22], which first introduced a graph pattern matching method
that supports exact and inexact queries on both node and edge
attributes as well as wildcard matches. This matching method
specifically cites intelligence analysis as a use-case and offers
great flexibility in the query construction, allowing analysts
to explore the unknown or uncertain connections. However,
this matching scheme still does not truly support uncertain
indicator-type matches or innocuous nodes that become sig-
nificant only in the context of other indicators.
Equally important are simulation-based matching schemes,
starting with bounded graph simulation [7] [9], to find mean-
ingful matches given a pattern graph with arbitrary or specified
path lengths in the connections. Later, dual and strong simula-
tions [9] [16] were developed to preserve query graph topology
through enforcement of both parent and child relationships in
the match and the imposition of locality constraints.
For the purposes of investigative search where a person
may exhibit an indicator behavior one or more times, we find
that simulation-based approaches may be most appropriate
due to the allowance of each query node to be matched to
multiple nodes in the data graph as long as match labels are
preserved at the match-level, as well as with the parent- and
child-levels. However, as previously mentioned in Section I,
dual simulation has several shortcomings with investigative
search, including the lack of allowance for partial matches,
incomplete remnant node matches, and lack of ability to
handle matches of innocuous activities that become important
only when observed with other suspicious indicators.
Lastly, because most graph queries end up returning many
matches given a large graph, researchers have also devised
ways to rank the most relevant matches using various goodness
functions. Such criteria include social impact [10], social
diversity [10], structural similarity [1] [14] [28], weighted at-
tribute similarity [1], and label similarity [14]. As sophisticated
as these ranking methods are, we find that none account for
intuitive red-flag indicators (i.e., those matches which demand
the immediate attention of an analyst) that are relevant in
investigative searches.
III. TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATION
Before we define investigative simulation in the next section,
we first review graph terminology and notation, as well as the
dual simulation graph pattern matching method.
Definition 1. Graph [16]. In our work, both the query graph
Q and data graph G are identically defined as a directed graphs
of the form G(V,E,L), where V is a set of nodes, E ⊆ V ×V
is a set of edges, in which (u, u′) denotes an edge from node
u to u′; and L : V ∪ E → Σ is a labeling function which
assigns nodes and edges to a set of labels Σ.
Definition 2. Dual Simulation [16] Graph G matches a
pattern Q via dual simulation if there exists a binary match
relation SD ⊆ VQ × VG such that:
• for all nodes u ∈ VQ there exists a node v ∈ VG such that
(u, v) ∈ S; and
• for each pair (u, v) ∈ S, u ∼ v (i.e., LQ(u) = LG(v)), and
for each edge (u, u′) ∈ EQ there exists an edge (v, v′) ∈ EG
such that (u′, v′) ∈ SD, and for each edge (u′, u) ∈ EQ
there exists an edge (v′, v) ∈ EG such that (u′, v′) ∈ SD.
We then refer to SD as a match (via dual simulation) to Q.
Dual Simulation was a significant advancement over graph
simulation and previous notions because it preserved not only
parent-child relationships, but also child-parent relationships in
the match and thus produced more sensible matches. However,
as described in Sections I and II, there are shortcomings when
performing investigative search. We summarize the notations
we utilize in this paper in Table I.
TABLE I: Summary of notations
Notation Description/Meaning
G Data graph G(VG, EG, LG)
Q Query graph Q(VQ, EQ, LQ)
SD Binary Match relation (via dual simulation)
SInvSim Match relation (via investigative simulation)
(u, u′) Directed edge from node u to u′
u ∈ VQ, v ∈ VG Nodes with index u (v) are in graph VQ
(VG), respectively.
R(u,v) Relevant set of matching node v ∈ VG w.r.t.
query node u ∈ VQ.
IV. INVESTIGATIVE SIMULATION
The proposed investigative simulation approach is described
next. We first describe an important categorical node labeling
method specific to investigative queries, provide a formal
definition of investigative simulation, and then propose an
algorithm for this new matching technique.
A. Categorical node labeling for investigations
We found that existing dual simulation technique over-
matches in investigative search because it returns matching
nodes that were not properly qualified in the query. Specifi-
cally, investigative queries may contain nodes that are repre-
sentative of perfectly legal and innocuous activities that are
only potential indicators of a latent behavior of interest when
they occur with other indicators. For example, purchasing a
firearm may only serve as a targeted violence threat indicator
if it is accompanied by an overt communication of threats to
others. At the same time, it is possible to identify indicators,
should they occur, which may be individually sufficient to
warrant further investigation. While we could use a numerical
node weighting scheme to ensure such indicator/node differ-
ences (as in [1] and [32]), we suspect that node weights may
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Node type (Abbreviation) Definition Source(s) Example(s) Sufficient for further
investigation
Query focus (QF) Subjects of an investigative query (i.e.,
we want individuals who match a par-
ticular pattern).
[10] 1) Person No
Individually innocuous
but related activity (IIRA)
Behavior that is individually not harm-
ful or threatening (and often common),
but in this context may be part of threat
when combined with something else.
N/A 1) Buying a gun
2) Having a social media account
No
Indicator (IND) Term used to broadly classify those
unusual behaviors which may suggest
that an individual is be a threat and
work more as potential building blocks
towards a threat assessment. Can en-
compass behaviors, traits, characteris-
tics, risk factors, and warning signs.
[5] [23] 1) Fascination with weapons
2) Purchasing large quantities of fertilizer
3) Downloading the Anarchist Cookbook
4) Re-tweeting a violent jihadist video
5) Watching a video from a violent ex-
tremist preacher
No
Red flag indicator (RF) Risk factors which, if present, will
singly determine that a case ranks as
a high risk or concern until proven
otherwise [18].
[18] [31] 1) Motives for violence 2
2) Homicidal ideas
3) Fantasies or preoccupations
4) Violent intentions or expressed threats
5) Pre-attack planning and preparation
6) Received terrorist training overseas
Yes
TABLE II: Categorical node labels for investigations
change when in the context of other indicators and as such
complicate the matching process. For example, while we may
initially want the indicator for purchasing a firearm to have
a relatively low weight when it is the only indicator of a
person as a threat, such an indicator would likely be weighted
much more heavily when it also occurred with the same person
making overt threats [5].
Fig. 2: Consistent with the node category definitions and
examples, we label the nodes in the example graph query
pattern Q as follows: query focus (A), individually innocuous
but related activity (B,G), indicator (C, D, and E), and red flag
indicator (F).
We thus propose a categorical weighting of nodes to the set
of node/edge labels Σ based upon research from the threat
assessment and homegrown violent extremist radicalization
literature, which has generally advocated for condition-based
weighting. See Table II for the definitions and examples
provided. The first category query focus (QF) is used to label
nodes which are the subject of the investigative query– namely
the people in the data graph. The second category individually
2See [31] for the definitions of example indicators 1-5.
innocuous but related activity (IIRA) is for activities which
need to occur in conjunction with other more suspicious
indicators to be worth further examination. The third category
indicator (IND) is a broad term to classify unusual behaviors
which may suggest a person is a threat. Lastly, the fourth
category red flag indicator (RF) is for activities which are
individually sufficient to warrant further investigation. If a node
does not fall in any of these categories, it can be labeled as
no category (NC). This initial modeling extension allows us to
address the non-sensible matches from dual simulation through
algorithmic modifications, which we describe in the following
section.
B. Definition of Investigative Simulation
Definition 3. Investigative simulation: An extension of dual
simulation for investigative search
Graph G contains partial or complete matches of pattern Q
if there exists a binary match relation SInvSim ⊆ VQ×VG such
that:
• for all nodes u ∈ VQ : L(u) = ‘QF’ and at least 1 node
u ∈ VQ : L(u) = ‘IND’ or ‘RF’ there exists a node v ∈ VG
such that (u, v) ∈ SInvSim;
• for each pair (u, v) ∈ SInvSim, where u ∈ VQ and v ∈ VG,
u ∼ v (i.e., LQ(u) = LG(v)), and
• for each edge (u, u′) ∈ EQ there exists an edge (v, v′) ∈ EG
such that (u′, v′) ∈ SInvSim, and for each edge (u′, u) ∈ EQ
there exists an edge (v′, v) ∈ EG such that (u′, v′) ∈ SInvSim.
We then refer to SInvSim as a match (via investigative simula-
tion) to Q.
Instead of all nodes in Q needing a match in G (as in dual
simulation), investigative simulation allows for partial matches
by only requiring all ‘QF’ nodes and at least 1 indicator node
(regular ‘IND’ or red-flag ‘RF’) to have a match in G. This
keeps matching results specific to ‘QF’ nodes with at least
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a single indicator-type that may make it worthy of further
analysis or investigation.
C. InvSim- Extension of dual simulation algorithm
One of the merits of the ‘DualSim’ algorithm for dual
simulation found in [16] was that it returns the entire binary
match relation SD, which contains not only complete matches
(connected component subgraphs for all nodes in Q) but also
remnant node matches (those nodes whose parent and/or child
were pruned away as a result of their connections). While [16]
never uses these remnant node matches in the construction of
the maximum subgraph, they in fact form the basis of the
partial matches that are informative for investigative searches.
However, they are by nature incomplete matches (e.g., in the
case of the network schema in the motivating example problem
in Fig. 1, the query focus nodes associated with remnant
indicator nodes were not in the match relation). We develop
a post-processing extension to the dual simulation algorithm
(Algorithm 1: InvSim, short for Investigative Simulation) that
corrects both issues specific to indicator-type patterns. In it we
utilize a modified 2-hop concept of a relevant set from [10].
Given a match v of a query node u in VQ, the relevant set of
v w.r.t. u (denoted as R(u,v)) includes all matches v′ of u′ for
up to the 2-hop descendants u′ of u in VQ.
Lines 1-9 are those lines found in [16], which is the imple-
mentation of the dual simulation algorithm and results in the
intermediate match relation SD. Our post-processing extension
to this algorithm begins in Line 10, when we iterate through all
nodes in the matching set in data graph G which are labeled
as ‘QF’ or query focus (i.e. persons). If the intersection of
the relevant set of v and the match relation SD (nodes v˜) are
all of type ‘IIRA’ (individually innocuous but related activity),
then we remove this node from the match relation and remove
its query focus parent if it was in the relation (Lines 11-12).
This effectively removes matching nodes that are considered
benign without the presence of other indicators, as well as the
associated person from further consideration.
Next, we ensure that the parent query focus nodes of other
matching nodes of type ‘indicator’ are included in the match
relation SD. We first search for all nodes v˜ that are both in
the relevant set of v and the match relation SD but whose
parent query focus node v is not yet in SD (Line 13). We
join this node v to the match relation (Line 14) as well as
add all nodes in the shortest path from node v to v˜ in the
match relation (Line 14). Finally, we consolidate and return
the modified match relation SInvSim (Line 15-16).
V. RESULTS
A. Real dataset for a proxy investigative search
In order to test investigative simulation on real data, we
utilized the BlogCatalog dataset,3 which is a scrape taken in
July 2009 of a social media site that allows users to register
and promote their own blog and connect with other bloggers.
The graph had over 470,000 nodes and over 4 million edges; it
3Available at http://dmml.asu.edu/users/xufei/datasets.html
is further detailed in Table III. The network schema shown in
Fig. 3(a) describes the node types and connections present
the network. In essence, an ID owns a User Id, which in
turn both authors blogs with a Weblog Id as well as forms
directed friendship connections with other User Ids. Lastly,
each weblog will provide one or more user-specified tags.
B. Query Description
To test the performance of the matching scheme and algo-
rithm, we devised a proxy query on a benign subject matter
with structural parallels to investigations as shown in Fig. 3(b).
The query focus is for user IDs who had been writing blogs
related to Microsoft Windows operating systems (XP and/or
Vista) and subsequently also began to write about Windows 7
when it was released in July 2009 (month in which the data
was collected). Node Z is a true person ID, node A is the user
ID query focus, and node B is the weblog with certain tags. All
C nodes are meant to be seen as labels of a post or blog entry
(i.e., determined through machine-classified semantic analy-
sis). The labels ‘computer’ (C535) and ‘windows’ (C2033)
are IIRA (i.e., relatively frequent labels which help provide
context or additional clarity on the true topic set), and labels
Algorithm 1: InvSim (for Investigative Simulation)
Input: Query graph Q with investigation category node
labels, and data graph G
Output: The match relation SInvSim of Q and G
1 foreach u ∈ VQ do
2 sim(u) :={v |v ∈ VG and LQ(u) = LG(v)}
3 while there are changes do
4 foreach edge (u, u′) ∈ EQ and each node
v ∈ sim(u) do
5 if there is no edge (v, v′) in G with v′ ∈ sim(u′)
then sim(u) := sim(u)\{v};
6 foreach edge (u′, u) ∈ EQ and each node
v ∈ sim(u) do
7 if there is no edge (v′, v) in G with v′ ∈ sim(u′)
then sim(u) := sim(u)\{v};
8 if sim(u) = ∅ then return ∅;
9 SD := {(u, v)|u ∈ VQ, v ∈ sim(u)}
10 foreach node v ∈ SD where L(v) =‘QF’ do
11 if L(v˜) =‘IIRA’ for all v˜ ∈ R(u,v) ∩ SD then
12 sim(u˜) := sim(u˜)\{v˜}; if node v ∈ SD then
sim(u) := sim(u)\{v};
13 if there exists a node v˜ ∈ R(u,v) ∩ SD and v /∈ SD
then
14 sim(u) := sim(u) ∩ {v}; if every node vˇ along
the shortest path from (v, v˜) is not in SD then
sim(uˇ) := sim(uˇ) ∩ {vˇ}, ∀(uˇ, vˇ) ;
15 SInvSim := {(u, v)|u ∈ VQ, v ∈ sim(u)}
16 return SInvSim.
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TABLE III: BlogCatalog Graph Characteristics
Characteristics Value
Total Nodes 471,267
Number of ids 88,781
Number of userids 80,949
Number of weblogs 127,227
Number of unique tags 174,310
Total Edges 4,098,290
Number of links from id to userid 88,784
Number of links from userid to userid 3,223,640
Number of links from userid to weblog 127,227
Number of links form weblog to tags 658,639
(a) (b)
Fig. 3: Network schema of the BlogCatalog graph (a). IDs own
account User Ids. User Ids author one or more Weblog Ids,
and are friends with other User Ids. Weblog Ids write about
one or more tags (which are user specified). Experimental
query for BlogCatalog data (b). Query focus is for User Ids
who had been writing blogs broadly related to ‘computers’ and
‘windows’, and specifically to Windows operating systems.
In this example, we treat the tag ‘windows 7’ as a red flag
indicator.
‘xp’ (C23136) and ‘vista’ (C20693) are indicators that the blog
is about Windows operating systems (i.e., necessary but not
sufficient for trajectory behavior). Finally, label ‘windows 7’
(C20684) is considered a red flag indicator.
C. Ranking Method and Analysis
As expected, investigative simulation returned meaningful
partial matches to the query. Our intuitive ranking scheme for
the top-k results was to 1) first order by the presence of any
‘QF’ nodes with red-flag (‘RF’) indicators, and 2) followed
by the size of the relevant matching set for each ‘QF’ node
(i.e., in decreasing order of |R(u,v) ∩SInvSim|, where LQ(u) =
LG(v) = ‘QF’). This method effectively highlights to analysts
those first who have red-flag indicators, followed by the those
who have the most indicators towards the latent behavior of
interest.
We find that investigative simulation performed well in the
matching, as measured with both quantitative and qualitative
methods. First, we quantitatively measured the similarity be-
tween the top-20 results with the original query pattern by
using the Jaccard similarity, and compared it with the top-20
ground truth results acquired through exhaustive search. The
(a)
(b) (c)
Fig. 4: A paired bar graph (a) showing the exact correspon-
dence of the top-20 query focus nodes by match size between
both InvSim and exhaustive search, where |R(u,v) ∩ SInvSim|
is the number of matching nodes in the relevant set of each
query focus node. Fig. 4(b-c): Top-4 results of investigative
simulation on the BlogCatalog dataset with the query in Fig.
3(b). The top-match (b) is User Id ‘u65530’ with 5 indicator
nodes matching in the relevant set (2 directed hops from Node
A). Note the presence of the red flag indicator ‘windows 7‘ in
each of these matches. The grayed-out nodes were the original
query nodes not matched.
paired bar graph in Fig. 4(a) shows the exact correspondence.
Qualitatively, we performed subjective validation of the sen-
sibility of each of the top-10 match results. The top-4 partial
matches to the query are shown in Fig. 4(b-c).
VI. TWO CASE STUDIES OF HOMEGROWN VIOLENT
EXTREMISM
In this section, we present two short case studies of recent
homegrown violent extremism to provide real-world context to
the modeling of on- and off-line behaviors as heterogeneous
data graphs, as well as to our investigative search approach.
While these graph-based connections were established after
the plot or attack in a subsequent law enforcement investi-
gation, we also aspire to demonstrate the analysis possible
if there were a better fusion of law enforcement and public
security databases with open-source social media.
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Case Study 1. Christopher Lee Cornell, an example of a
recent homegrown violent extremist in the United States, was
arrested by the FBI in January 2015 for allegedly planning
to employ pipe bombs at the U.S. Capitol and then open
fire on nearby people. From the criminal complaint [30] and
other open sources [13], we employed a methodology called
process-tracing to identify increasing indicators of radicaliza-
tion that ultimately led up Lee’s purchase of weapons to use
in a planned attack. The indicators include Lee’s purported
activity on Twitter with references to jihadist recruiter Al
Awlaki and other terrorists, posting of Islamic State propa-
ganda videos, and his attack planning with an FBI confidential
human source. When the signals and indicators are combined
into a heterogeneous data graph, there are a total of 43 nodes
and 16 discernible classes in the class graph as shown in
Fig. 5 (produced in NodeXL [25]). These classes are devised
from the political science literature on potential indicators of
homegrown terrorists [12] [15] [18] [23] [24].
Fig. 5: US Capitol Attack Plot, 2015. Example class graph of
Christopher Lee Cornell showing the indicators and signals of
his radicalization and progress towards an attack.
Case Study 2. The next case study is the San Bernardino,
California terrorist attack on December 2, 2015. The perpetra-
tors Syed Farook and wife Tashfeen Malik conducted a mass
shooting and attempted bombing that killed 14 people and
injured 22 at the Inland Regional Center. Enrique Marquez has
also been charged with conspiring to provide material support
to terrorists [29]. Just as in the Lee case, critical signals in
this case were embedded in the perpetrators’ social media
posts. For example, nearly a month before the attack, Marquez
purported posted this exchange on Facebook with another
user: “No one really knows me. I lead multiple lives and I’m
wondering when its all going to collapse on M[e]...Involved
in terrorist plots, drugs, antisocial behavior, marriage, might
go to prison for fraud, etc.” [29]. In future work, we propose
to include n-grams or key words as nodes in the data graph.
Connections to those nodes from the social media posts serve
to link the most suspicious phrases and words that may warrant
further investigation from law enforcement officials.
It is also interesting to note that the indicators of radicaliza-
tion and attack preparations were not present in just a single
Fig. 6: San Bernardino Terrorist Attack, 2015. Example class
graph of Syed Farook, Tashfeen Malik, and Enrique Marquez
showing the indicators and signals of their collective radical-
ization and preparations for the attack.
individual, but in all three (as shown in Fig. 6). This case study
points out the need to explore conspiratorial graph patterns
(where there is match complementarity over more than one
query focus node), which is not currently addressed by any
extant matching techniques. As part of our ongoing work in
investigative graph simulation, we propose to identify these
types of conspiracy cells through query-focus node cluster
matching.
Insights for Real-World Investigative Search. These two
case studies provide a real-world context to the challenges
of applying graph pattern matching to aid in the search for
homegrown violent extremists. In particular, constructing the
query is problematic because almost all existing graph pattern
matching approaches rely on certainty in the query and do
not have a categorical node labeling structure for indicators.
Between the two case studies, one can discern the variabil-
ity in the presence of indicators as well as the significant
number of nodes which might be classified as ‘individually
innocuous but related activities.’ Investigative simulation seeks
to address these issues by allowing for partial matches of a
comprehensive indicator query, suggesting node categories for
investigative searches, and pruning or augmenting the match
relation to produce sensible matches and fewer false positives.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The availability of user-generated content in the form of
blogs, micro-blog posts, and videos has led many researchers
to study the potential for detecting latent signals of human
behavior for a variety of business and security-related pur-
poses. In this paper, we have introduced investigative graph
search as a process of searching for and prioritizing persons of
interest who may exhibit part or all of a pattern of suspicious
behaviors or connections. We also propose the technique of
investigative simulation as an extension of dual simulation
for investigative searches. We show that this form of graph
pattern matching produces more sensible matches and more
complete partial matches through the imposition of categorical
node labels related to indicators, as well as offer an algorithm
7
to find the matches.
There are many planned areas of future work in inves-
tigative search and investigative simulation which we will
briefly mention here. First, we intend to find more efficient
implementations of the InvSim matching algorithm that use
a combination of indexing techniques and early termination
approaches to find the top-k matches. Second, as identified
in the San Bernardino case study in Section VI, we intend
to formulate the problem and devise efficient algorithms for
match complementarity to help identify conspiratorial plots
and threats.
Beyond investigative search in the static setting, we ulti-
mately seek to incorporate graph dynamics with the imposition
of timestamps on edges in both the query graph Q and the
data graph G (building upon the work in [26]). This important
extension would not only provide analysts with the ability to
match by time or sequence, but would also give them a sense
of the pace of indicator connections in latent behaviors of
interest.
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